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Comments
The Misappropriation. Theory:
Too Much of a Good Thing?
In recent cases,' criminal liability for violation of rule 10b-5 of
the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act 2 has been imposed upon per-
sons who have traded in the securities markets using illegally obtained,
nonpublic information.3 Until recently, criminal liability for violations
of rule lOb-5 was based upon the violation of the fiduciary duty of
a corporate insider using private corporate information to manipulate
the stock market.' The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however,
has fashioned a theory based upon the misappropriation of confiden-
tial information to expand liability for trading with material nonpublic
information.' The misappropriation theory makes nondisclosure of
1. SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984); U.S. v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.
1981); SEC v. Mussella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 437 (S.D. N.Y. 1984); see Wall Street Journal,
Jan. 21, 1985, at 6, col. 2 (Wall Street Journal reporter prosecuted for violating rule lOb-5
after utilizing confidential information in stock transactions).
2. 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5. Rule lOb-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or mails or of any facility of any national
exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
Id.
3. See infra notes 87-124 and accompanying text; see also, Note, Second Circuit Expands
Section 10(b) Liability to Security Committed in Breach of an Employee's Fiduciary Duty:
United States v. Newman, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REv. 417, 420 [hereinafter cited as Second Circuit
Expansion]; Note, Securities-Rule lOb-5-Corporate Outsider May Be Liable For Failure to
Disclose or Abstain Under Rule 10b-5 Based on Employer-Employee Relationship-U.S. v.
Newman, 13 SETON HALL L. Rav. 178, 179 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Securities Regulation].
4. See, e.g., Speed v. Transamerica Co., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
5. See SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984); U.S. v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d
Cir. 1981).
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material nonpublic information in a securities transaction a violation
of rule lOb-5 if the information has been obtained through the breach
of a fiduciary duty.6 Under the misappropriation theory, the breach
of any fiduciary duty will be sufficient to impose liability under rule
lOb-5, whether or not the breach actually affected any parties to the
securities transaction.7
The expansion of rule lOb-5 liability under the misappropriation
theory is not in accord with United States Supreme Court decisions.'
The Supreme Court has held that before rule lOb-5 sanctions may
be invoked, a fraudulent breach of duty between the parties to the
transaction must be proved. 9 The misappropriation theory is in con-
flict with decisions of the Supreme Court concerning the scope of
liability under rule lOb-5 because the misappropriation theory bases
liability upon the nature of information rather than the relationship
between the traders.' 0 The misappropriation theory gives the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) greater latitude under rule lOb-5
to curb insider trading.1" The Supreme Court, however, has inter-
preted the scope of liability under rule 1Ob-5 more narrowly,' 2 leaving
the task of expanding the powers of the SEC to Congress.' 3
The misappropriation theory creates a general basis for rule lOb-5
liability because liability is based upon the illegal nature of the
information. " The SEC has extensive regulatory powers under the
misappropriation theory that, if abused, could inhibit the free flow
of information in the stock markets." The possibility of a chilling
effect on the flow of information would be contrary to the rationale
of the 1934 Securities Act, which is to achieve full disclosure of in-
formation in the stock market. 16
6. See infra notes 87-124 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 109-24 and accompanying text.
8. See Note, Trading on Confidential Information-Chiarella Takes an Encore: United
States v. Newman, 56 St. John's L. Rev. 727, 740 (1982).
9. See infra notes 48-79 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 87-124 and accompanying text.
11. Liability under the misappropriation theory is more extensive than liability imposed
by the majority holding in Chiarella; consequently, the SEC could be more active in curbing
the use of illegally obtained information. See Misappropriation Theory is Adopted for lOb
Inside Trading Criminal Liability, 3 THE COMPANY LAWYER 239, 240 (1982).
12. See infra notes 48-79 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 125-69 and accompanying text.
14. See Note, Second Circuit Expansion, supra note 3, at 425.
15. See Wall Street Journal, February 26, 1985, at 30, col. 3; see also Kotler, Reporter
Charged With Insider Trading, 5 THE CAriVORNIA LAWYER 45, 45-46 (Feb. 1985).
16. See 5 J. Ellenberger & E. Maher, Legislative History of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1933 and 1934, item 18 (1973).
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The purpose of this comment is to compare and contrast the misap-
propration theory with the rationale of the United States Supreme
Court decisions pertaining to the scope of liability under rule 10b-5
for nondisclosure of inside information. This author first will discuss
the rulings that initially interpreted the scope of rule 1Ob-5 liability
for nondisclosure. Recent United States Supreme Court decisions,
which have narrowed the scope of liability under rule 10b-5, also will
be discussed.' 7 The misappropriation theory and cases utilizing this
theory subsequently will be analyzed. These cases then will be com-
pared with the rationale of both the recent Supreme Court cases 8
and recent Congressional enactments. 9 This author will conclude that
the misappropriation theory should be abandoned as a basis for im-
posing rule lOb-5 liability, leaving to Congress the duty to fashion
regulations to remedy specific problems.2" Prior to this analysis,
however, a brief discussion of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 is
appropriate.
History of Rule lOb-5
Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 193421 is designed
to give the SEC22 broad powers to assure fairness and integrity in
the stock market.23 The expansive language of section 10(b) evidences
Congressional intent to guard against fraudulent manipulations of the
stock market similar to those that led to the market crash of 1929.24
In 1942, the SEC promulgated rule lOb-5, creating a comprehensive
prohibition against any "act, practice or course of business which
17. See infra notes 22-35 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 97-108 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., §14(e) and rule 14e-3 discussed infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 125-69 and accompanying text.
21. 15 U.S.C. §78j(b). Section 10(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person... (b) to use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security, registered on the national securities exchange or
any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission [SEC] may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
22. The SEC is an independent, quasi-judicial government agency established in 1934 to
administer the Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934. H. Henn & J. Alexander, Laws
of Corporations §298, at 825 (1983). The responsibilities of the SEC include the creation, en-
forcement, and implementation of rules pursuant to the Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933
and 1934, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939,
the Investment Corporation Act of 1940, and the Investment Advisor Act of 1940. Id.
23. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202 (1976).
24. See W. Painter, Federal Regulation of Insider Trading 1-6 (1968).
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would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities." 2
Liability under rule lOb-5 results from some form of active fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities.26 Liability for trading on nonpublic information,
therefore, depends upon whether the nondisclosure constitutes fraud. 7
Section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 provide little guidance in determining
whether the nondisclosure of a material fact will constitute a viola-
tion of rule lOb-5 and section 10(b). 28 Two early rulings from the
SEC and the Second Circuit analyzed whether rule lOb-5 requires
disclosure of material nonpublic information prior to trading. These
cases interpreted rule 10b-5 as imposing an affirmative duty upon the
traders and insiders to disclose nonpublic information before trading
on the information.2 9
The initial SEC ruling that imposed liability for nondisclosure was
In re Cady, Roberts Co.3" In this decision, the SEC disciplined a broker
for trading on inside information received from a board member of
a corporation that the corporation intended to reduce dividends.3' The
SEC declared that anyone obtaining material nonpublic information 2
through someone who has a position as a corporate insider must
disclose that information or abstain from trading in those securities."
The effect of Cady, Roberts was to expand the scope of liability
under rule lOb-5 by enlarging the definition of a corporate insider
to include more than directors and majority stockholders.", The ruling
established two prerequisites to the imposition of liability. First, a
relationship affording access to inside information intended only for
a corporate purpose must exist. Second, the advantage gained by the
25. 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5.
26. See Note, Securities Law-Rule lob-5 Fraud, 58 U. DET. J. URB. L. 320, 329 (1981).
27. See infra notes 64-79 and accompanying text.
28. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980); Comment, Duty to Disclose
Inside Information Arises From a Fiduciary or Special Relationship Between Parties to a Securities
Transaction: Chiarella v. U.S., 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 1013, 1021 (1980).
29. See infra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
30. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
31. Id. at 905.
32. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) The Court in Texas
Gulf stated that information is material if a substantial likelihood exists that a reasonable man
would consider the information important or if the information might affect the value of the
stock. Id.; see also TSC Industries v. Northway Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1975) (definition of
materiality in the context of proxy solicitations under rule 14a-9).
33. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 911-12.
34. Traditionally, corporate insiders included officers, directors, and controlling stockholders.
Id. at 911. The rule announced in Cady, Roberts specifically includes any person with access
to inside information. Id. at 912.
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insider trading on the undisclosed information must be found to be
unfair."
The Cady, Roberts "disclose or abstain" rule was expanded by the
Second Circuit in the case of S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur.3 6 Texas
Gulf held that anyone in possession of material nonpublic informa-
tion is under a duty to disclose the information to the investing public
or abstain from trading in the stock of the corporation.3 The im-
position of an affirmative duty upon anyone in possession of material
nonpublic information is an extreme departure from the common law
cause of action for misrepresentation. 38 The duty to disclose tradi-
tionally is imposed upon only traders owing a duty to the corporation. 39
Texas Gulf broadly extends liability because the mere possession of
nonpublic information triggers the duty to abstain from trading even
to persons not owing a duty to the corporation.4" Predictably, the
adoption of an overinclusive duty to disclose in Texas Gulf created
a deterrence to the free flow of information. 41 Interpreting rule lOb-5
to proscribe all trades involving inequality of information is an un-
warranted extension of liability into areas Congress did not intend
the rule to cover. 2
The scope of the duty to disclose under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5
is clearly unsettled. Since the promulgation of the Securities Act of
1934, Congress has not addressed the question of the scope of sec-
tion 10(b) 3.4  Absent clear guidance from Congress, judicial interpreta-
35. The ruling in Cady, Roberts involved a fiduciary duty by a corporate officer to keep
corporate information confidential. Id.
36. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); see Note, Securities Regulation,
supra note 3, at 185.
37. Texas Gulf, 401 F.2d at 848.
38. See Restatement (Second) Torts §551(1) (1977).
One who fails to disclose to another a fact that he knows may justifiably induce
the other to act or refrain from acting in a business transaction is liable to the other
as though he had represented the nonexistence of the matter that he has failed to
disclose if he is under a duty to the other to excercise reasonable care to disclose
the matter in question.
Id. (emphasis added). Under the common law, the fiduciary duty to disclose was applicable
only to top officers and board members. See Kardon v. National Gypsum, 73 F. Supp. 798,
800 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
39. See Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980).
40. See id.
41. See, e.g., Dirks v. U.S., 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3259-60 (1983) (Raymond Dirks tipped
nonpublic information that had been obtained without fraud). Cf. Kerr, Suitability Standards:
A New Look at Economic Theory and Current SEC Disclosure Policy, 16 PAc. L.J. 805, 823
(1985) (market professionals require the freedom to ascertain and disseminate as much informa-
tion as possible).
42. See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663, 700 (1974). "It seems anomalous to jigsaw every kind of corporate dispute into the federal
courts through the securities acts as they are presently written."Id.
43. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233.
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tion of rule 10b-5 has been inconsistent. 44 The United States Supreme
Court has addressed the issue of rule 10b-5 liability for nondisclosure
in two recent cases, Chiarella v. United States 5 and Dirks v. United
States."6 Liability for nondisclosure under rule 10b-5 was limited in
these decisions to those instances in which the nondisclosure constituted
fraud.
47
United States Supreme Court Decisions Regarding Nondisclosure
The scope of the "disclose or abstain" rule and liability for trading
with material nonpublic information first was addressed by the United
States Supreme Court in Chiarella v. United States.48 In Chiarella,
the Court held that liability for trading with material nonpublic in-
formation was limited to those persons who owed a fiduciary duty
to a party to the sale.4 9 Chiarella, a mark-up man for a financial
printer in New York City, had access to confidential information re-
garding upcoming tender offers." The offering corporation would give
the information to the printing house, disguised by false names,
numbers, and blank spaces, to be prepared for dissemination to the
public.5' Chiarella handled five planned transactions in which he was
able to ascertain the target companies and use the confidential infor-
mation to buy the stock of the companies.52 Chiarella's trading netted
him more than $30,000 in fourteen months.
The SEC investigated, and Chiarella subsequently was indicted on
criminal charges for violating rule 10b-5.53 The jury found Chiarella
guilty of securities fraud because he had traded in the securities market
without disclosure of all material nonpublic information." The Se-
cond Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that
all persons who have regular access to material nonpublic informa-
44. See, e.g., Morrison, Silence is Golden: Trading on Nonpublic Market Information,
8 SEC. REG. L.J. 211, 213-15 (1980).
45. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
46. 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
47. Id. at 3263; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235.
48. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 222.
49. Id. at 235.
50. Id. at 224. A mark-up man designs and prepares financial documents. Id. To prepare
the documents, the information must be given sometime before a tender offer or merger plan
is made public. Id.
51. Id.
52. Four of the transactions were tender offers and one was a merger attempt. Id.
53. SEC v. Chiarella, No. 77 Civ. Action No. 2534 (GCG) (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 1977) noted
in Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224, n.2, 225.
54. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 236. Chiarella also was required to return the profits to the
sellers of the stock. Id. at 236.
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tion have an affirmative duty to disclose before trading on the non-
public information. 51
On certiorari, 56 the United States Supreme Court expressly rejected
the theory that rule 10b-5 imposes a duty to disclose based upon the
mere possession of nonpublic information. 7 Building upon the com-
mon law requirements for fraud, the Court held that a relationship
of trust and confidence between the buyers and the sellers of securities
must exist before an affirmative duty to disclose material nonpublic
information may be imposed." The Second Circuit ruling was reversed
because liability had been imposed without requiring a breach of a
fiduciary relationship to a party involved in the transaction.5 9
The holding in Chiarella limited the expansion of liability under rule
10b-5. The United States Supreme Court found no evidence of Con-
gressional intent to broadly prohibit trading with nonpublic
information." ° Instead, the Court took notice of the detailed and
sophisticated rules promulgated by Congress to regulate the, securities
market as an indication of the intent to limit the scope of rule lOb-5
liability.6" An interpretation of rule 10b-5 that imposes liability without
a fiduciary duty involved conflicts with previous limited enactments
of Congress concerning nondisclosure.62
The holding in Chiarella, which limited the scope of rule 1Ob-5 to
those instances involving a breach of a confidential or fiduciary
63relationship, was reinforced by the United States Supreme Court
in Dirks v. United States.6 Dirks was an investment analyst of in-
surance company securities for institutional investors.65 Dirks received
information from a former officer of Equity Funding of America that
an extensive fraud was being perpetrated by Equity Funding against
the investors in the fund.66 Dirks investigated the charges and, although
55. Chiarella v. SEC, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978).
56. 441 U.S. 942, No. 78-1202 (1978).
57. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232-33.
58. See id. at 235.
59. See id. at 233.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 234. The Court also noted that Congressional action in the area of securities
fraud has been very limited and specific, with no broad prohibitions enacted. Id.
63. Id. at 235. The United States Supreme Court declined to rule on the alternative theory
advanced by the SEC in Chiarella that the breach of duty by Chiarella to his employer satisfied
the rule lOb-5 requirement of "fraud in connection with the sale or purchase of securities."
Id. at 236.
64. 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
65. Id. at 3258.
66. See Wall Street Journal, Apr. 2, 1973, at 1, col. 6.
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he could not find any concrete proof of fraud, the allegations were
corroborated by lower level employees.67
Neither Dirks nor his employer owned any stock in Equity Funding,
but Dirks advised clients and other advisors to sell their Equity Fund-
ing securities.68 As a result, $16 million worth of Equity Funding
securities were sold, resulting in a decline in the value of that stock."
Trading in Equity Funding was halted and the SEC investigated, un-
covering evidence of a massive fraud. Dirks also was investigated and
subsequently indicted for securities violations, including fraud for non-
disclosure of material nonpublic information under rule 1Ob-5. °
At trial, the SEC urged the court to hold that anyone who know-
ingly receives nonpublic material information from an insider has a
duty to refrain from trading on the information. 7' The administrative
court convicted Dirks of violating rule lOb-5 after adopting the SEC
standard.72 The basis for the conviction was the use of material non-
public information in tipping" others of the fraud at Equity Funding.74
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court rejected this theory,
relying upon the holding in Chiarella that the mere receipt of non-
public information from an insider will not create a duty to disclose
the information.75 The Court held that the following elements must
be established: (1) a violation of an existing fiduciary duty to the
corporation or to the shareholders by the tippor; (2) the information
must be given to the tippee for personal gain; and (3) the tippee must
have knowledge of the fiduciary breach. 6
For the nondisclosure by the tippee to be actionable as fraud, a
breach of a fiduciary duty by the tippor constituting fraud would
be required.77 Dirks received the information from an insider at Equity
Funding who had tipped the information without any intent to gain
personally or defraud the shareholders.78 The Supreme Court held
that no fraud can exist, even if a breach of fiduciary duty is shown,
67. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3258-59.
68. Id. Dirks also publicly tried to disclose the allegations against Equity Funding to the
Wall Street Journal, but the paper would not print the story without more definite proof. Id.
69. See, id. In a two week period the price of Equity Funding stock fell 42%. Id.
70. Id. at 3259.
71. Id. at 3262.
72. Id. at 3259.
73. A tippee is a person who is given information by an insider, the tippor, in breach
of a trust. See Black's Law Dictionary 771 (5th ed. 1983).
74. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1982).
75. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3263.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 3264.
78. Id. at 3267.
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unless the violation of a confidential relationship is for personal gain. 79
The tipping to Dirks did not constitute a violation of rule 10b-5 because
the tipping was not done for personal gain and, therefore, no fraud
was perpetrated.
The rationale of the United States Supreme Court in Chiarella and
Dirks indicates that general liability cannot attach for nondisclosure
based solely upon the use of nonpublic information. 0 In addition
to the mere use of this information, a fraudulent breach of duty must
be shown. The majority of the Court in Chiarella declined to rule
on the misappropriation theory advanced by the SEC.8 Chief Justice
Burger, dissenting in Chiarella, approved of the imposition of an
affirmative duty to disclose or abstain from trading with any material
nonpublic information illegally obtained through breach of a duty
to an employer.12 According to Chief Justice Burger, liability should
not be based solely upon the breach of a fiduciary duty to the cor-
poration or party involved in the buying or selling of stock.83 Certain
lower federal courts, notably the Second Circuit, have adopted the
reasoning of the dissent in Chiarella to avoid the limitations imposed
by the majority opinion. 84
The rationale of Chiarella and Dirks prohibit imposition of liability
under rule 1Ob-5 on the sole basis of trading with material nonpublic
information.85 The propriety of the misappropriation theory has not
been addressed directly by the United States Supreme Court; the ques-
tion has been expressly left open in Dirks and Chiarella. Use of the
misappropriation theory as a basis for rule 10b-5 liability, however,
is inconsistent with the rulings of that Court. Nonetheless, two Se-
cond Circuit cases decided since Chiarella have relied upon a breach
of duty by an employee to satisfy the fraud requirement for prosecu-
tion under rule 10b-5. 86
79. Id. at 3266.
80. See id.; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232-33, see also, Comment, supra note 28, at 1013;
Note, supra note 26, at 320.
81. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 236.
82. Id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
83. Id.
84. In addition to the Second Circuit cases discussed infra notes 97-108 and accompanying
text, the misappropriation theory has been used by other federal courts. See e.g., SEC v. Blavin,
557 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Mich. 1983). But see Feldman v. Simkins Industries, 492 F. Supp.
839 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (following the holding of the majority in Chiarella).
85. See supra notes 48-79 and accompanying text.
86. The use of the misappropriation theory is not exclusive to the Second Circuit. See
supra note 84.
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The Misappropriation Theory
In the Second Circuit, trading on illegally obtained nonpublic in-
formation constitutes a violation of rule lOb- 5.87 To date, liability
for the use of misappropriated information has been based upon the
breach of a fiduciary duty to an employer by an employee 8 to keep
client information confidential.8 9 Liability is not necessarily limited
to breaches of fiduciary duties by corporate insiders, buyers or pur-
chasers of securities. Consequently, the misappropriation theory ex-
pands the scope of liability for nondisclosure imposed by the Supreme
Court in Dirks and Chiarella.9 ° The misappropriation theory allows
a breach of a fiduciary duty that is unrelated to the actual sales trans-
action to trigger the duty to disclose or abstain from trading with
material nonpublic information."
Under the misappropriation theory, liability attaches because the
use of illegal information acts as a "fraud on the market" in con-
trast to fraud being perpetrated against a particular purchaser or seller
of stocks.92 The fraud-on-the-market rationale does not require a
breach of a fiduciary duty to a party, in connection with a trans-
action in securities, to establish liability under section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5. 9' Under this rationale, the use of misappropriated information
is unfair and exploitative of the market.94 The misappropriation theory,
in effect, nullifies the holding in Chiarella by establishing a duty to
disclose based upon the character of the information rather than the
duty to a particular person or organization."
In cases since Chiarella, the Second Circuit has utilized the misap-
propriation theory to impose liability upon those who trade with
87. See Materia, 745 F.2d at 201; Newman, 664 F.2d at 17; SEC v. Mussella, 578 F.Supp.
425, 435 (2d Cir. 1984).
88. The cases discussed in this comment pertain to breaches of client confidentiality by
employees. See infra notes 97-108 and accompanying text. The misappropriation theory also
has been used in cases involving a breach of a news reporter's duty of silence to the newspaper,
but where neither the reporter nor the newspaper owe a fiduciary duty to a corporation involv-
ed. See Wall Street Journal, Jan. 21, 1985, at 6, col. 2.
89. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Newman, 664 F.2d at 17;
Note, supra note 11, at 239.
90. See Note, An Outsider Who Misappropriates Confidential Information May be Charged
With Fraud: U.S. v. Newman, 31 De Paul L. Rev. 849, 861-66 (1982).
91. See Note, United States v. Newman: Misappropriation of Market Information by Out-
siders, 3 PACE L. REv. 311, 338-41 (1983).
92. See SEC v. Mussella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The court in Mussella
based liability for violation of rule lob-5 on the misappropriation of confidential information,
not fraudulent nondisclosure. Id.; see also Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233 (rejecting the parity-of-
information rationale for rule 10b-5).
93. Newman, 664 F.2d at 17.
94. See Id. at 17-18.
95. See Note, supra note 8, at 736.
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illegally obtained or misappropriated market information.96 The first
case to employ the misappropriation theory to impose liability under
rule 10b-5 was U.S. v. Newman." Newman received confidential and
misappropriated information from two employees of investment bank-
ing firms concerning takeover and merger attempts by the clients of
the firm. 98 Newman, a securities trader, passed the information to
others who, in turn, used foreign bank accounts and a variety of
securities brokers to buy up the stock of the target companies.9 9 The
Second Circuit held that Newman had violated rule lOb-5 by using
confidential information obtained in breach of a fiduciary duty to
the employers of the tippors.' °0 Criminal liability was imposed under
rule lOb-5 in Newman, for the use of confidential, nonpublic infor-
mation obtained through a breach of a fiduciary duty, even though
that duty was unrelated to the actual transaction.' 1
A 1984 case decided by the Second Circuit has reaffirmed the misap-
propriation theory established in Newman. SEC v. Material°2 involv-
ed a factual situation very similar to Chiarella.'°" Materia worked as
a copyholder'04 for a large New York financial printing house."0 5 Us-
ing his position, Materia was able to ascertain the identities of four
firms soon to be involved in takeover attempts.'0 6 Materia acquired
almost $100,000 by trading on the basis of confidential information
misappropriated from the clients of his employer. 07 The court, in
finding Materia to have violated rule lOb- 5, relied upon the ruling
in Newman that "anyone who misappropriates nonpublic informa-
tion in breach of a fiduciary duty and trades on such information
to his own advantage violates Section 10(b) and rule lOb-5."'' 0
The misappropriation theory, as articulated in Newman and Materia,
imposes liability for the use of any nonpublic and illegally obtained
inside information.'0 9 The Supreme Court in Chiarella and Dirks,
96. See infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text; SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425,
435 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
97. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
98. Id. at 15.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 17.
101. Id. at 16.
102. 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984).
103. Chiarella 445 U.S. at 224. See supra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
104. Materia, 745 F.2d at 199. A copyholder reads the copy of the financial document
to a proofreader. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 194.
108. Id. at 201.
109. See id.; Newman, 664 F.2d at 17; see also supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
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however, employed a more limited scope of liability under rule lOb-
5.II Specifically, the Supreme Court rejected the holding of Texas
Gulf, which imposed liability whenever security transactions involved
the use of nonpublic information, holding that fraud in connection
with a securities transaction is a prerequisite to rule lOb-5 liability.'II
The rationale in Chiarella and Dirks indicates that liability for the
use of nonpublic information under rule lOb-5 is premised upon the
relationship between the parties to the securities transaction." 2 Follow-
ing Chiarella, liability is limited to those situations in which the buyer
or seller has been defrauded." 3 Extensive liability for nondisclosure
could result in a chilling effect on the dissemination of information
that allows for an efficient market."' For example, in Dirks, the
market reaction to the inside information was responsible for bring-
ing the Equity Funding fraud to light.' If Dirks had not divulged
the inside information about Equity Funding, the fraud would have
continued." 6 Complete information is required to enable participants
in the stock market to set prices equal to actual value of the stock.' I
Limiting the use of nonpublic information may hinder legitimate and
helpful stock market practices such as the detection of mismanage-
ment or fraud that occurred in Dirks.
In contrast, the misappropriation theory focuses on the elimina-
tion of unfair advantages by emphasizing the illegal and nonpublic
character of the information."' The misappropriation theory does not
base rule lOb-5 liability on the Chiarella theory of fraudulent
nondisclosure." 9 Instead, liability is premised upon the misuse or
unethical manipulation of the stock market.' 20 The misappropriation
theory allows the SEC to utilize rule 10b-5 to punish traders who
take advantage of the stock market by using stolen information. 12'
110. See supra notes 48-79 and accompanying text.
111. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233.
112. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232-33; Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3261.
113. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234-35.
114. See Morrison, supra note 44, at 218 (quoting from the amicus brief filed in Chiarella
by the securities industry outlining five areas that might be considered illegal under a general
liability standard); Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the
Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1031, 1055-56 (1977).
115. See Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3259, n. 8.
116. See id.
117. See Note, supra note 114, at 1056; Kerr, supra note 41, at 823.
118. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3261; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231-32, n. 14; see Note, supra note
26, at 331.
119. See Newman, 664 F.2d at 17. Liability under the misappropriation theory turns upon
the existence of fraud to an employer. Id. Since, however, there is no breach of duty to a
party actually injured by the the nondisclosure, the fraud rationale is only a means of cir-
cumventing Chiarella. Note, supra note 8 at 734. See also Note, supra note 90, at 863.
120. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text; see also Newman, 664 F.2d at 17.
121. See Note, supra note 8, at 740.
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The misappropriation theory attempts to ensure a fair market by pro-
moting equality of information among all traders.'22
Rule 1Ob-5 should insure fairness without arbitrarily impeding the
efficiency of the market. Although these aims are conflicting, care
must be taken to accomodate both of them. The imposition of liability
based upon the illegal character of the information alone sacrifices
market efficiency by limiting the disclosure of important market
information.' 23 The chilling effect of the misappropriation theory on
the stock market illustrates that the theory is an inappropriate vehi-
cle to ensure the dual aims of rule lOb-5. 24
The Adverse Effects of the Misappropriation Theory
Chiarella and Dirks narrowly interpreted the scope of rule lOb-5,
requiring the breach of a fiduciary duty in connection with the sale
or purchase of securities as a prerequisite to rule 10b-5 liability. 25
Consistent with this narrow interpretation, Congress enacted section
14(e), which prohibits the use of inside information only when the
information concerns tender offers.' 26 The limited scope of section
14(e) indicates a Congressional policy favoring specific and narrow
rules for nondisclosure.'27 In contrast, the misappropriation theory
supplies a broad basis for rule lOb-5 liability by classifying the use
of information obtained through any breach of a fiduciary duty as
fraudulent. '2 8
The effects of limitations imposed by the misappropriation theory
are counterproductive to the aims of equality of information and
fairness. Unnecessary limitations on the dissemination of information
impairs the efficiency of the market by lowering the total pool of
available information. 129 Additionally, broad liability for the use of
inside information will create a more inequitable market because, by
resticting the flow of information, no incentive is present to disseminate
important market information and only the top analysts are privy
to the information. 30
122. Id.
123. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234; Block & Barton, Securities Litigation, 10 SEc. L.J.
350, 371 (1983); Note, supra note 90, at 866.
124. See infra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 48-79 and accompanying text.
126. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233; see also 15 U.S.C. §78m(d)(1) (allows tender buyer to
obtain 5% before disclosing takeover plan).
127. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233, n.16.
128. See supra notes 87-124 and accompanying text.
129. See Wall Street Journal, Feb. 26, 1985, at 30, col. 3; Kotler, supra note 15, at 45-46.
130. See Wall Street Journal, Feb. 26, 1985, at 30, col. 3.
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In Chiarella, the United States Supreme Court recognized that sec-
tion 10(b) was a "catch all" section, but stated that "what it catches
must be fraud." 3' Under the misappropriation theory, the fraud re-
quirement is satisfied by any breach of fiduciary duty.'32 In Santa
Fe Ind. v. Green, 33 however, the Supreme Court held that not every
breach of a fiduciary duty will be considered fraud.'34 Consequently,
a nonfraudulent breach of duty cannot support an action under rule
10b- 5.13
5
Santa Fe held that a violation of section 10(b) must involve a decep-
tive or manipulative practice used to defraud a party to a securities
transaction.' 36 In Santa Fe, the defendant corporation was accused
of violating section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 for trying to freeze out'"
the minority shareholders of Kirby Lumber Company.' 35 The Santa
Fe corporation, a majority shareholder, wanted to acquire 100% of
Kirby Lumber by forcing the minority shareholders to agree to a
buy-out.'3 9 The minority shareholders argued that they were being
forced to accept an offer that had been arrived at in violation of
the fiduciary duty owed by the majority shareholder to the other
shareholders of Kirby Lumber.' 0 The Court held that more than a
mere breach of a fiduciary duty is necessary to violate rule 10b-5;
deception, misrepresentation, or fraudulent nondisclosure in connec-
tion with the sale also must be proved.' 4 ' The decision in Santa Fe
clearly established that not every breach of a fiduciary duty will be
actionable as securities fraud.' 4 2 The Supreme Court in Santa Fe gave
a limited reading to the language of rule 1Ob-5.'I The Court in San-
ta Fe refused to adopt a body of case law that could be interpreted
so broadly that the workings of the securities markets could be
impeded."'
The rationale for liability under the misapproporiation theory is
131. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235.
132. Newman, 664 F.2d at 17.
133. Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1976).
134. Id. at 474.
135. Id. at 476.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 467. A freeze-out is an attempt to eliminate minority shareholders for other
than corporate purposes, or to force a sale at an unfair price. Id.
138. See id. at 466.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 467.
141. Id. at 473-74.
142. Id.
143. See Id.
144. Id.
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that rule 1Ob-5 prohibits any use of fraudulent or deceptive manipula-
tion in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.1 1 5 The use
of information that has been misappropriated from an employer can
constitute the fraud required for liability under this theory. The misap-
propriation theory bases liability on the misappropriation of infor-
mation rather than nondisclosure of information.' 6 The misappropria-
tion theory, however, does not account for the fact that a breach
of a duty to an employer is not always fraudulent. The theft of con-
fidential information may be illegal and morally reprehensible, but
may not fall under the prohibitions against fraud in rule 10b-5 because
the actual market transaction was accomplished between two parties
in an arms length deal.'47 The misappropriation theory is not founded
upon a breach of duty to the buyers or sellers of securities, but upon
the fact that the information was obtained through illegal means. '
Rule lOb-5 and section 10(b) were not intended to regulate the type
of information used in the securities transactions. '49 Instead, these
provisions were intended to regulate the relationship between the parties
engaged in the transactions.' 50
The misappropriation theory erects rule 10b-5 as a barrier to the
use of any illegally obtained inside information."'5 The United States
Supreme Court, however, narrowly limits the use of rule 10b-5 to
cases that constitute fraud, leaving Congress to establish detailed regula-
tions concerning the use of illegally obtained information.' 52 Congress
responded to the misuse of information regarding tender offers by
enacting narrow prohibitions against the use of any confidential
information.' 53 These prohibitions are embodied in a new section to
the Securities and Exchange Act and rule 14e-3 that expressly pro-
hibits anyone from exploiting the market by using confidential infor-
mation concerning tender offers.' 54 This action illustrates that Con-
gress recognizes the problem of the scope of liability under rule 10b-5
and is willing to remedy the problem by specific legislation.
Section 14(e) addresses the narrow problem of the misuse of infor-
145. See supra notes 87-124 and accompanying text.
146. Block & Barton, supra note 123, at 353; Note, supra note 28, at 1024.
147. See supra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 113.
149. See Note, supra note 8, at 734; see generally Block & Barton, supra note 123.
150. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234; and see notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
151. See Block & Barton, supra note 123, at 364-65.
152. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
153. 15 U.S.C. §78n(e). Section 14(e) and the corresponding rule 14e-3 prohibits any untrue
statement or omission in connection with a tender offer. See 17 C.F.R. §240.14e-3.
154. Id.; see Block & Barton, supra note 123, at 371.
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mation regarding tender offers. The section therefore will not unduly
affect the flow of information in the stock market. Section 14(e)
evidences Congressional intent to maintain the credibility of the stock
market. Furthermore, the narrow scope of the statute indicates that
Congress intended not to unduly impede the workings of the
marketplace.' 5" The misappropriation theory, in stark contrast to the
intent of Congress attempts to give the SEC wide latitude in policing
the securities market. The possible cost of a wide prohibition on the
use of nonpublic information in securities transactions, however,
outweighs the benefits to be gained by equalizing trader access to in-
side information.' 5 6
Promoting equality of information in the securities market by pro-
hibiting use of misappropriated information will not ensure equality
because the theory discourages disclosure of information instead of
encouraging disclosure. Extensive liability for disclosing information
merely decreases the number of people who have access to such
information.'57 As noted, traders who have inside market informa-
tion that would benefit other traders will not disclose the useful
information.' 8 Influential traders, market professionals, and analysts
will solidify their market position by holding a virtual monopoly on
market information, tips, and gossip.'5 9 Concentration of informa-
tion in fewer hands facilitates exploitation of the market rather than
fairness.
Certain uses of nonpublic, illegally obtained information, however,
clearly are unfair and manipulative of the stock market.' 6 Rule lOb-5
is not designed specifically to differentiate useful nonpublic informa-
tion from manipulative uses of nonpublic information.' 6' What is im-
portant to understand is that inside or nonpublic information alone
does not undermine the confidence in the market or violate the trust
shareholders have in corporate directors.' 62 The free flow of infor-
mation is essential to the successful operation of the market; moreover,
155. Congress has considered the enactment of stricter standards for insider trading after
Chiarella with the introduction of the Insider Tradings and Sanctions Act of 1982. See Block
& Barton, supra note 123, at 367.
156. See Kerr, supra note 41, at 829; Note, supra note 114, at 1074.
157. See Kotler, supra note 15, at 45; Wall Street Journal, Feb. 26, 1985, at 30, col. 3.
158. See Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3263.
159. See Wall Street Journal, Feb. 26, 1985, at 30, col. 3.
160. See Alison Anderson, Fraud, Fiduciaries, and Insider Trading, 10 HoFsTRA 341, 353
(1982); Note, supra note 90, at 861.
161. See Block & Barton, supra note 123, at 866.
162. See Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 476-77.
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the use of nonpublic information can be helpful in preventing fraud,
since the market participants are more informed.' 63
An expansive interpretation of rule 10b-5 may reach the best solu-
tion in certain situations. Illegal practices of the type used by the
defendants in Chiarella,'6 Newman,' 61 and Materia'66 clearly are un-
fair and should be prohibited. Rule 10b-5, however, is not the best
means to achieve this end. Rule 10b-5 was not designed to combat
every unfair situation accompanying securities transactions.' 67 Only
those situations that include a breach of a fiduciary relationship were
intended to be proscribed.' 61 Consequently, the misappropriation theory
should be abandoned as a basis for liability under rule 10b-5 and
section 10(b). This theory conflicts with the rationale of the Supreme
Court as expressed in Chiarella and Dirks and exposes rule lOb-5 as
an inadequate tool for distinguishing useful nonpublic information
from the purely unfair.' 69
Conclusion
This author has outlined the two major judicial interpretations
of the limitations imposed by section 10(b) of the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934 and rule lOb-5 with respect to the duty to disclose
nonpublic information before trading in the stock market. The United
States Supreme Court in Santa Fe, Chiarella, and Dirks has premised
rule 10b-5 liability upon common law fraud principles that require
a fiduciary relationship between the parties before a duty to disclose
arises. The United States Supreme Court expressly rejected the im-
position of 10b-5 liability in the absence of a confidential relation
ship. In contrast, the misappropriation theory imposes a duty to
disclose on all those who trade upon illegally obtained, material non-
public information.
163. The use of inside information by Raymond Dirks forced the SEC to investigate Equity
Funding and uncover the massive fraud. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3259-60. Without the market
reaction to the dissemination of the inside information, the fraud may have gone undetected. Id.
164. Chiarella divined the targets of takeover attempts from the financial documents he
prepared for his employer. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224.
165. Newman received confidential information concerning takeover attempts from employees
of investment banking firms. Newman, 664 F.2d at 15. Newman would then pass the stolen
information to other traders. Id.
166. Materia, in his position as a copyholder, was able to deduce the identity of four cor-
porations that were targets of upcoming tender offers. Materia, 745 F.2d at 199.
167. But see Anderson, supra note 160 at 373-77. The analysis recognizes the problems
with lOb-5 as currently interpreted, but would propose to judicially tailor rule lob-5 instead
of relying on Congressional action. Id.
168. See Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3262-63; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235.
169. See Block & Barton, supra note 123, at 364; Note, supra note 90, at 866; Second
Circuit Expansion, supra note 3, at 426.
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The interpretation of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 under the misap-
propriation theory is inconsistent with the rationale of the United States
Supreme Court decisions. The requirement of fraud in connection with
the sale or purchase of securities is missing under the misappropria-
tion theory because a general duty to disclose merely upon posses-
sion of illegally obtained information is imposed. The misappropria-
tion theory is an attempt to insure a more equitable and fair market
through absolute equality of information in the stock market. The
Supreme Court, however, has refused to allow the promotion of
fairness through excessive restrictions on the workings of the market,
as illustrated in both Chiarella and Dirks.
The misappropriation theory imposes excessive liability and con-
flicts with the United States Supreme Court interpretation of section
10(b) and rule lOb-5. Consequently, the misappropriation theory must
be rejected as a theory of liability for violations of rule l0b-5. The
stock market likely will be affected adversely by adherence to an in-
terpretation of secton 10(b) and rule 10b-5 that requires all inside
information used in the trading of securities be equally available to
all investors. The intricacies of the securities market cannot be regulated
through a general prohibition on the use of misappropriated inside
information. The Supreme Court has elected to relegate to Congress
the responsiblity of detailing specific regulations necessary to insure
the integrity of the market without disruption. The securities market
functions well with a minimum amount of uncertainty and a max-
imum amount of information. The misappropriation theory increases
uncertainty and decreases the pool of available information. Intelligent
and detailed Congressional action is the best way to ensure that the
delicate task of separating the harmful from the helpful inside infor-
mation is accomplished.
Edward Douma
